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In July of 1951, Sir R. A. Fisher (1890– 1962) used the occa-
sion of his Bateson Lecture to refl ect on statistical methods in ge ne tics 
(see fi gure 8.1). Having made foundational contributions to both statistics 
and ge ne tics beginning arguably in 1918, Fisher saw them as quintessential 
twentieth- century disciplines. While nineteenth- century antecedents could 
be easily found for both, statistics and ge ne tics came to maturity as “dis-
tinct points of view” in the twentieth century.1 Fisher played an important 
role in articulating the point of view of both modern ge ne tics and modern 
statistics, but more importantly, he successfully managed their integration. 
In doing so, Fisher did more than bring his training in mathematics to bear 
on biological topics. He used his mathematical abilities to reconceive statis-
tics, experimentation, and evolutionary biology.
Fisher came to biology as an outsider in the sense that his formal train-
ing as a student emphasized mathematics. His interests in ge ne tics and 
eugenics, however, began early as well. Even though there  were other well- 
known synthesizers of mathematics and biology at the time, Fisher’s in-
terests and training  were not typical of the great majority of biologists of 
his day. Fisher’s innovative work in statistical biology met both with indif-
ference from many biologists, as a result, and oft en opposition from more 
established statistical biologists.
The opposition that Fisher’s innovations faced led him to comment, “A 
new subject for investigation will fi nd itself opposed by indiff erence, by in-
ertia, and usually by ridicule. A new point of view, however, aff ecting thought 
on a wide range of topics may expect a much fi ercer antagonism.”2 The sta-
tistical, ge ne tic, and experimental “points of view” that Fisher championed 
developed signifi cantly over the fi rst de cades of the twentieth century. The 
antagonism they faced only pushed Fisher to refi ne them further. A more 
passive advocate may have been pushed to the margins, but Fisher’s per sis-
tence, personality, and patrons allowed him to redefi ne how mathematics 
could be brought into the core of biological thought and practice.
michael r. dietrich & robert a. skipper, jr.
r. a. fisher and the foundations 
of statistical biology8
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articulating new points of view
In retrospect, Fisher claimed that ge ne tics was a natural source for sta-
tistical thinking because of its heavy use of frequencies and the natural 
randomization of genotypes that make ge ne tic experimentation easy. How-
Figure 8.1:  R. A. Fisher.
Photograph by SPL/Photo Researchers, Inc.
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ever natural the synergy between ge ne tics and statistics may be, Fisher was 
initially drawn to their intersection through eugenics and biometry. As a 
student at Cambridge from 1909 to 1913, Fisher studied mathematics but de-
veloped broad interests. As he himself commented, he entered Cambridge 
on “the centenary of Darwin’s birth and the jubilee of the publication of The 
Origin of Species.”3 William Bateson, Mendel’s En glish champion, had been 
given a professorship the year before, and in 1912 it would be endowed as the 
Arthur Balfour Chair of Ge ne tics.4 Darwinism, Mendelism, and the debates 
over their diff erences would have been unavoidable for Fisher at Cambridge. 
Eugenics made them irresistible.
Sir Francis Galton inaugurated the En glish eugenics movement in 1869 
with his book Hereditary Genius.5 Galton’s eugenics rested on the scientifi c 
management of human heredity by encouraging reproduction among those 
supposed to be “fi t” and discouraging reproduction of the supposedly “un-
fi t.” In doing so, eugenicists hoped to direct the course of human evolution.6
Once introduced to the rising eugenics movement, Fisher’s youthful en-
thusiasm led him to help form the Cambridge University Eugenics Society 
in 1911. Eugenics for Fisher was not a passing fad, however. His intellectual 
interest in the topic never faltered, and Fisher sought to live by the eugenic 
principles that he advanced by having eight children.7
Eugenics formed the natural bridge between Fisher’s interest in mathemat-
ics and the new fi elds of ge ne tics and statistics. In turn- of- the- century En-
gland, Francis Galton and Karl Pearson occupied this intersection, and it was 
to their work that Fisher turned as a college student. In order to understand 
the resemblance between generations, Galton had developed techniques of 
correlation and regression to represent heredity from a statistical point of 
view. Like his cousin, Charles Darwin, Galton believed that hereditary traits 
 were continuous gradations of form best described by a normal distribution. 
An individual’s heredity then was represented in terms of a law of ancestral 
heredity, in which an individual’s ancestors each made a diminishing contri-
bution.8 Inspired by Galton’s approach, Karl Pearson developed biometrics, 
a statistical approach to biology, which supported a Darwinian view of the 
gradual evolution of continuous traits under the direction of natural selection.
In 1911, Fisher addressed the Cambridge Eugenics Society on the intersec-
tion of Mendelism and biometry. At the time, Mendelism was cast by Wil-
liam Bateson in diametric opposition to the biometrical approach advocated 
by Karl Pearson. For Bateson, Mendelism supported his view of discrete 
hereditary characters and saltational evolution. However, as a dispute, the 
arguments between Mendelians and biometricians also raised questions 
about the appropriate role of probability and statistics. Fisher was taken 
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by exactly these questions, and in his overview of both positions notes the 
role of probability in each and praises the power of the biometrical use of 
statistics to analyze biological observations without relying on theory or ab-
straction. Moreover, from a eugenic point of view, the biometrical approach 
convinced him that it was possible to create “a slow and sure improvement 
in the mental and physical status of a population” without the complica-
tions of the “experimental breeding” that Mendelism would require.9
While still an undergraduate, Fisher made his fi rst foray into statistics 
with his 1912 paper, “An Absolute Criterion for Fitting Frequency Curves.”10 
Inspired by work on the theory of errors in astronomy and mathematics, 
Fisher criticized the least squares method and the method of moments. 
John Aldrich claims that Fisher’s true target  here was Karl Pearson’s 1902 
essay, “On the Systematic Fitting of Curves to Observations and Mea sure-
ments.”11 Pearson favored both of these methods, but Fisher found their jus-
tifi cation to be arbitrary, and so their agreement with each other was prob-
lematic rather than reassuring. In their place, he championed an approach to 
error he had learned from the astronomers based on Gauss’s least squares 
method.12
The dominant school of thought at the time was Bayesian and employed 
what was called the method of inverse probability. Named for Thomas Bayes, 
the Bayes theorem for any two events A and B claims that the conditional 
probability of event A given event B is:
P(A|B) = P(B| A)P(A)
P(B)
.
In this equation, the probability of event A, P(A), is called the prior probabil-
ity, meaning that it is the probability of A before event B. The probability of 
A given B or aft er B has occurred is the posterior probability. The Bayes theo-
rem tells us how to adjust our prior probability of A in light of a new event 
B; or the prior probability of a hypothesis, H, in light of evidence, E. In more 
direct terms, Bayes theorem addresses the problem of how new evidence 
can guide the revision of our previous beliefs— it addresses the problem of 
induction.
At the time Fisher was writing, it was common practice to recognize that 
if the prior probability was unknown, then one could assume that there 
was, in Pearson’s words, an “equal distribution of ignorance” so all prob-
ability values of H are the same, or all beliefs about the probability of H are 
equivalent. This means that the probability of H given E does not depend 
on the prior probability of H, but on the remaining term, P(E/H)/P(E). Fisher 
was critically examining the claim that the curve that best fi ts the data was 
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the one that maximized the posterior probability. What he was proposing 
was that maximizing P(H/E) and maximizing P(E/H)/P(E)  were not equiva-
lent. In fact, they  weren’t even both probabilities.
Fisher was a frequentist. He believed that probabilities described rela-
tive frequencies of events in a certain number of trials or experiments. The 
probability of a kind of occurrence was estimated by the ratio of the number 
of observed occurrences of an event for a given total number of trials. More-
over, given an infi nite number of trials, the ratio of the number of events 
to the number of trials will converge on the true probability value. Fisher 
understood the Bayesian approach as trying to assign a probability value to 
something that was unique— not subject to repeated trials, and not subject 
to sampling as a result. For Fisher, it was legitimate to ask about the prob-
ability of observing an experimental outcome, but it did not make sense to 
speak of the probability of a hypothesis. To diff erentiate these approaches, 
Fisher distinguished the probability of a hypothesis from its likelihood. The 
likelihood of a hypothesis given some evidence is equivalent to the probabil-
ity of the evidence given the assumption of the hypothesis. For Fisher, maxi-
mizing likelihoods was the more statistically sound method of estimation 
and curve fi tting since it could be grounded in observed frequencies. In mak-
ing his case for the distinction between probability and likelihood, Fisher 
would transform the foundations of statistics. Translating the resulting 
authority from statistics to biology and demonstrating the deep relevance 
of statistics to biology  were crucial in Fisher’s transformation from a math-
ematician to a biologist.
Fisher was drawn to the theory of errors by a paper by “Student,” re-
ally W. S. Gosset who was not allowed by his employer, Guiness Brewing, 
to publish under his own name since the statistical test was considered a 
trade secret. Gossett addressed the problem of estimating error when using 
a small sample size. This led Fisher to consider how to estimate error when 
calculating a correlation coeffi  cient for small samples. Moreover, Fisher’s 
maximum likelihood method gave importantly diff erent results from Gos-
sett’s. The fi ne points of Fisher’s essay  were not fully grasped by Gossett or 
Pearson, who read it and discussed it in correspondence, but they did ap-
preciate that Fisher was a young talent in statistics.
Aft er graduation Fisher spent some time working on a farm in Canada, 
presumably to rest his notoriously poor eyesight. However, Fisher seemed to 
genuinely love farm life and would settle on a farm when he married in 1917. 
By then Fisher had returned to En gland and, determined to do his part for 
the war eff ort, taught mathematics and physics at public schools since he 
was not eligible for military ser vice.
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In 1914, Fisher published a proof of Gosset’s solution using multidimen-
sional geometry. While other statisticians did not share Fisher’s fondness 
for geometrical reasoning about distributions, Pearson did publish it in 
his journal Biometrika.13 Pearson’s group was also occupied during the war 
with distributions of correlation coeffi  cients, and in 1916, his group pub-
lished a paper critical of Fisher’s approach, claiming that it depended on the 
Bayes theorem. The injustice of this claim stung Fisher and motivated him 
clarify his stance on likelihood as an alternative to Bayes. At the same time 
it signaled a declining relationship with Pearson, who declined to publish 
Fisher’s 1916 paper on correlation with regard to Mendelian traits. Pearson 
probably thought of himself as the se nior professor helping to sort out the 
younger Fisher, and sent Fisher extensive comments on another 1916 note 
regarding error and estimation. Fisher responded by seeking to put sta-
tistics on a fi rmer mathematical foundation that directly took aim at the 
substantial work of Pearson.14 When Fisher published his own criticisms of 
Pearson, their enmity became mutual. However, as historian Stephen Sti-
gler has convincingly argued, the antagonism that Fisher felt toward Pear-
son certainly spurred him to develop his method of maximum likelihood 
and articulate the grounds for the justifi cation of statistical methods.15
Throughout this period Fisher had maintained his interest in eugenics 
and sought an active role in the Eugenics Education Society. This interest 
brought him into contact with Major Leonard Darwin, Charles’ fourth son 
and an avid eugenicist himself.16 Darwin became Fisher’s mentor and advo-
cate around 1914, when Fisher began publishing book reviews for Eugenics 
Review. While Fisher scraped by fi nancially as a farmer and teacher, Darwin 
arranged for a stipend from the Eugenics Society. This undoubtedly helped 
fuel the fi re that led Fisher to write over 200 reviews on eugenics over twenty 
years.
But the relationship was something more. Fisher revered Darwin and 
sought his approval. When he discovered that Darwin and Pearson had 
had a disagreement on the eff ects of natural selection on the correlation of 
hereditary traits, Fisher sought to vindicate Darwin, but Darwin counseled 
restraint.17 Nevertheless, Darwin encouraged Fisher to continue his work on 
the intersection of statistics and heredity. Indeed, when Fisher’s paper on 
the correlation of relatives was rejected by Pearson for Biometrika, Darwin 
sponsored its publication in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edin-
burgh. This paper helped Fisher land two job off ers the next year: one in the 
Galton Laboratory and one at the Rothamsted Experimental Station. He 
chose Rothamsted.
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evolution from a statistical ge ne tics point of view
When Fisher was at Rothamsted Experimental Station from 1919 to 1933, he 
engaged with a mass of biological data that allowed him to revolutionize sta-
tistics, and he become convinced of the value of engaging statistical analysis 
with real biological data. Researchers at Rothamsted had accumulated years 
of data on crop growth and yield under a wide range of diff erent conditions. 
Fisher’s challenge was to fi nd something biologically interesting in that data. 
What he found and published in a series of papers was important both biolog-
ically and statistically. Biologically, Fisher was able to disentangle the eff ects 
of various fertilizer treatments from soil, weather, and cultivation conditions. 
At the same time, Fisher developed methods for statistical experimentation 
based on randomization and the analysis of variance that would radically 
change the way in which any researcher could conduct a statistical experi-
ment in the future. These methods  were published in 1925 as Statistical Meth-
ods for Research Workers.18 Initial reviews  were critical as primarily En glish 
statisticians struggled to make sense of this new empirical approach. Refl ect-
ing on this later, Fisher off ered that recognition takes time when the revision 
of cherished beliefs bruises the feelings of their holders. Fisher’s recognition 
came fi rst from abroad, where experimental agriculture was established and 
appreciated in institutions such as the USDA and many land grant universi-
ties in the United States.19
Fisher’s work on the analysis of variance as applied to biology had begun 
much earlier in his work on correlation in evolution. In his 1918 paper, “On the 
Correlation of Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance,” Fisher 
considered the statistical consequences of dominance, epistatic gene inter-
action, assortative mating, multiple alleles, and linkage on the correlations 
between relatives. Fisher argued that the eff ects of dominance and gene inter-
action would confuse the actual ge ne tic similarity between relatives. He also 
knew that the environment could confuse such similarity. Fisher  here formally 
introduced the concepts of variance and the analysis of variance. He wrote:
When there are two in de pen dent causes of variability capable of produc-
ing in an otherwise uniform population distributions with standard de-
viations σ1and σ2, it is found that the distribution, when both causes act 
together, has a standard deviation 1
2 + 22 ). It is therefore desirable in 
analyzing the causes of variability to deal with the square of the standard 
deviation as the mea sure of variability. We shall term this quantity the 
Variance of the normal population to which it refers, and we may now 
ascribe to the constituent causes fractions or percentages of the total 
variance which they together produce.20
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Fisher used this new tool to partition the total variance into its compo-
nent parts. He labeled that portion of the total variance that accurately de-
scribed the correlation between relatives the “additive” ge ne tic component 
of variance. The “nonadditive” ge ne tic component included dominance, gene 
interaction, and linkage. Environmental eff ects, such as random changes 
in environment, comprised a third component of the total variance. In 1922, 
on the basis of his 1918 work, Fisher argued that the additive component of 
variance was the most important for evolution by natural selection. Indeed, 
he argued that, particularly in large populations, nonadditive and environ-
mental components of the total variance are negligible. Selection would act 
most strongly on any factor with a large additive contribution to the total 
ge ne tic variance, usually by eliminating them from the population.21 Most 
of the time, evolution, and especially adaptation, proceed very slowly, with 
low levels of selection acting on mutations of small eff ect and in large popu-
lations holding considerable ge ne tic variation. Where Fisher’s 1918 paper 
defended the principles of Mendelian heredity against the criticisms of the 
biometricians, his 1922 paper defended Darwinism using the principles of 
Mendelian heredity. Fisher’s aim was to respond to a set of criticisms that 
Darwinian natural selection cannot be the correct mechanism of evolu-
tion because the ge ne tics of populations are such that there is not enough 
variation available for selection to act upon. During the course of the paper, 
Fisher eliminated from consideration what he took to be insignifi cant evo-
lutionary factors, such as epistatic gene interaction and ge ne tic drift , and 
placed his confi dence in natural selection.
Fisher’s synthesis of Mendelism and Darwinism within a mathematical 
framework culminated in his 1930 book, The Ge ne tical Theory of Natural 
Selection, which became one of the principal texts, along with those of J. B. S. 
Haldane and Sewall Wright, establishing the fi eld of theoretical population 
ge ne tics.22 Fisher begins his book with his case for the mutual compatibility 
of Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection and Mendelian ge ne tics. He 
ends it by exploring the eugenic consequences of this statistical and ge ne tic 
understanding of the evolutionary pro cess. Fisher considered the fi rst two 
chapters, on the nature of inheritance and the “fundamental theorem of nat-
ural selection,” the most important of the book. Indeed, these two chapters 
accomplish the key piece of the reconciliation by continuing the general ar-
gument strategy he had used in 1918 and 1922 of defending Mendelian partic-
ulate inheritance and then demonstrating how Darwinian natural selection 
may plausibly be the principal cause of evolution in Mendelian populations.
Fisher’s mathematical approach is most fully developed in his second 
chapter of The Ge ne tical Theory of Natural Selection. The arguments  here are 
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drawn largely from Fisher’s 1922 paper “On the Dominance Ratio” and his 
1930 paper “The Distribution of Gene Ratios for Rare Mutations,” which was 
a response to Sewall Wright’s correction of Fisher’s 1922 paper. Three key 
elements may be distilled from Fisher’s “heavy” mathematics in the second 
chapter of The Ge ne tical Theory. The fi rst is a mea sure of average population 
fi tness, Fisher’s “Malthusian pa ram e ter” (i.e., the reproductive value of all 
genotypes at all stages of their life histories). The second is a mea sure of 
variation in fi tness, which Fisher partitions into ge ne tic and environmental 
components (based on his distinctions from 1918 and 1922). The third is a 
mea sure of the rate of increase in fi tness (i.e., the change in fi tness due to 
natural selection). For Fisher, “the rate of increase of fi tness of any organism 
at any time is equal to its ge ne tic variance in fi tness at that time” (emphasis in 
original).23 This last element is Fisher’s “fundamental theorem of natural 
selection,” and it is the centerpiece of his theory of natural selection.
Interestingly, inasmuch as Fisher considered his fundamental theorem 
the centerpiece of his evolutionary theory, it happens that the theorem is also 
the most obscure element of it. The theorem was oft en misunderstood until 
1989, when Warren Ewens rediscovered George Price’s 1972 clarifi cation and 
proof of it.24 Fisher’s original statement of the theorem in 1930 suggests that 
mean fi tness can never decrease because variances cannot be negative. Price 
showed that in fact the theorem does not describe the total rate of change in 
fi tness but, rather, only one component of it. That part is the portion of the 
rate of increase that can be ascribed to natural selection. And, actually, in 
Fisher’s ensuing discussion of the theorem, he makes this clear. The total rate 
of change in mean fi tness is due to a variety of forces including natural selec-
tion, environmental changes, epistatic gene interaction, dominance, and so 
forth. The theorem isolates the changes due to natural selection from the 
rest, a move suggested in Fisher’s 1922 paper. The relative importance of 
the additive component of ge ne tic variance was increasingly appreciated in 
the ge ne tics community aft er the Second World War. Price and Ewens recog-
nized this and clarifi ed the statement of the theorem by substituting “additive 
ge ne tic variance” for “ge ne tic variance” (since ge ne tic variance includes both 
an additive and nonadditive part). With the theorem clarifi ed, however, Price 
and later Ewens argue that it is not so fundamental. Given that it is a state-
ment about only a portion of the rate of increase in fi tness, it is incomplete. 
The Price- Ewens interpretation of the theorem is now the standard one.
Fisher compared both his 1922 and 1930 exploration of the balance of 
evolutionary factors and the “laws” that describe them to the theory of gases 
and the second law of thermodynamics, respectively. Of the 1922 investiga-
tion, Fisher says,
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the investigation of natural selection may be compared to the analytic 
treatment of the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make the most 
varied assumptions as to the accidental circumstances, and even the es-
sential nature of the individual molecules, and yet to develop the natural 
laws as to the behavior of gases, leaving but a few fundamental constants 
to be determined by experiment.25
He continues the analogy in 1930, adding that
the fundamental theorem . . .  bears some remarkable resemblances to 
the second law of thermodynamics. Both are properties of populations, 
or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which com-
pose them; both are statistical laws; each requires the constant increase 
in a mea sur able quantity, in the one case the entropy of the physical 
system and in the other the fi tness . . .  of a biological population. . . . 
Professor Eddington has recently remarked that “The law that entropy 
always increases— the second law of thermodynamics— holds, I think, 
the supreme position among the laws of nature.” It is not a little instruc-
tive that so similar a law should hold the supreme position among the 
biological sciences.26
The received view of these comparisons is that Fisher’s interests in phys-
ics and mathematics led him to look for biological analogs.27 No doubt this 
is part of the story. However, a more plausible interpretation of the compari-
son comes from treating Fisher’s 1918, 1922, and 1930 works as one long argu-
ment. If we do so, we fi nd that Fisher’s strategy in synthesizing Darwinian 
natural selection with the principles of Mendelian heredity was to defend, 
against its critics, selection as an evolutionary cause under Mendelian prin-
ciples. Following this argument strategy, Fisher built his ge ne tic theory of 
natural selection piecemeal, or from the bottom up. That is, Fisher worked 
to justify the claim of his fundamental theorem by constructing plausi-
ble arguments about the precise balance of evolutionary factors. Thus, his 
piecemeal consideration of the interaction between dominance, gene inter-
action, ge ne tic drift , mutation, selection,  etc. led to his theorem. It was not, 
at least not primarily, the search for biological analogues to physical models 
and laws that underwrites the theorem.
No one has thought that Fisher’s contribution to evolutionary ge ne tics 
was less than groundbreaking. Rather, precisely what Fisher established, its 
nature and scope, and exactly how he did so, has been less than clear. With 
Fisher’s work on variance in 1918, his work on the balance of factors in evo-
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lution in 1922, and his fundamental theorem of natural selection in 1930, 
we have a unifi ed argument setting aside pervasive anti- Darwinism, origi-
nating a new mathematical approach to the evolution of populations, and 
establishing the very essence of natural selection.
The Ge ne tical Theory sealed Fisher’s reputation as a biologist. In 1933, he 
succeeded Karl Pearson as the Galton professor at University College London. 
His work on mathematics had earned him a place in the Royal Society in 1928. 
His 1925 book, Statistical Methods for Research Workers, was changing the way 
experimental biology could be conceived.
conclusion
R. A. Fisher made extraordinary contributions to the mathematical founda-
tions of statistics, statistical methods for experimentation, and the cre-
ation of population and evolutionary ge ne tics. When combined with his 
strong belief in the social value of eugenics, the range of Fisher’s interests 
pose a serious challenge to historians who would like to make sense of how 
one person could simultaneously pursue such disparate topics and make 
such important contributions to each. Fisher’s daughter and biographer, 
Joan Fisher Box, off ered separate chapters tracing simultaneous trajectories 
through his mathematics, statistics, ge ne tics, and eugenics.28 Other histori-
ans treat Fisher’s interests in isolation from each other, and in doing so cast 
themselves in sharp contrast to historians who see Fisher’s interests as mu-
tually informed.29 Having posed the question of how nonbiological training 
can foster innovation in the life sciences, we fi nd ourselves seeking points 
of intersection in Fisher’s work. These intersections are plentiful, but what 
 were the historical conditions that allowed Fisher to fi nd success in these 
intersections?
We claim that patronage and per sis tence played crucial roles in allowing 
Fisher to successfully bring his mathematical and statistical perspectives 
into biology. The patronage of Leonard Darwin early in his career facilitated 
the publication of Fisher’s seminal 1918 paper on the correlation of rela-
tives, and supported his work at the intersection of biology, eugenics, and 
statistics. At the same time, Fisher’s personality allowed him to stubbornly 
persist in the face of Pearson’s criticism and later opposition. Fisher’s will-
ingness to engage in a dispute and to oppose Pearson and the entrenched 
views on inverse probability were crucial in the history of his development 
of the foundations for theoretical statistics, on the one hand, and the meth-
ods of estimation and experimentation crucial to biology and evolutionary 
 ge ne tics, more specifi cally.
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We do not wish to claim that the success of Fisher’s contributions are 
solely the result of patronage or Fisher’s personal advocacy. Their value and 
utility  were recognized by many. In the case of experimental design and sta-
tistical inference, Fisher’s work found an eager audience among agricultural 
experts around the world following the path of Mendelism in an age of faith 
in scientifi c progress.30 However, intellectual worth alone did not overcome 
the barriers set by Pearson and other statisticians. Fisher’s results  were 
innovative, but the intersection of statistics, ge ne tics, eugenics, and evolu-
tion was not an empty niche waiting to be fi lled. It took time for Fisher’s 
early work to gain ac cep tance among the statistical and scientifi c communi-
ties. What allowed him to continue to innovate in statistical biology was the 
support of individuals, like Leonard Darwin, and institutions like Rotham-
sted, where his methodological insights more readily produced new results 
for fi eld researchers.
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